New Jersey Pilot Kills Himself and Son in Predictable Plane Crash

A new post yesterday on the All-Things-Aviation.com blog related "3 stories about pilots who didn’t learn, didn’t care and didn’t survive." I was all too familiar with one of those stories having read about it in the Cape May County Herald after it occurred last month. There's something particularly heart rending about a Private pilot taking off with his son into a 300 foot overcast with the all too predictable result. Clearly this pilot was not a student of history, aircraft accident data, or FAA regulations. Otherwise he would have realized that he needlessly threw away his life and that of his son.

The pilot was 53 years old, had a total of 395 hours and was not instrument rated. According to witnesses, the pilot had originally planned to depart KOBI, the Woodbine Municipal airport in Woodbine, NJ, for a family hunting trip to Indiana two days before the accident, but weather postponed his trip. The following day, the pilot requested assistance from the airport manager in using an internet-based flight planning tool and accessed DUATs once that evening.

The next morning, the day of the accident, IMC prevailed, but the forecast called for conditions to improve as the day progressed. The recorded weather conditions at the airport reported an overcast ceiling at 300 feet above ground level (agl) for the period from 10 AM to noon. This is considered low IFR and in fact the ceiling was below the minimums for the published instrument approach procedures at the airport. Witnesses universally reported a solid overcast ceiling was present at 200 to 300 feet agl, that "there were no holes" in the ceiling, and that "there was no sun" shining anywhere that they could see.

About 10:40 AM, the pilot radioed his intention to depart and began his takeoff roll on runway 31 in his 1972 Piper Arrow. According to newspaper reports, his wife “Valerie, 52, was actually very close to getting on the plane with her men. Even though she wasn’t packed for the trip, she was going to fly with them, buy some clothes in Indiana, and fly back on a commercial flight in a few days. The only reason she didn’t go was because Ted saw the break in the clouds and wanted to take advantage of it right away. There wasn’t time to get her on the flight.”

The quote speaks volumes about the state of mind of the pilot. If there wasn’t “enough time to get her on the plane,” then clearly he felt that he was trying to depart through a very narrow window of opportunity. Narrow windows mean narrow margins of safety. This pilot was so intent upon completing his mission—one which had already been delayed for two days—that he was willing to take on extraordinary risks without thought for his own safety. No sane Private pilot should take off into a 300 foot solid overcast.

In that frame of mind, the pilot was probably looking for any possible hint that the trip might be possible. “I was there and I saw what he saw,” his wife told the Herald. “There was a break in the weather. There was a thin spot where the sun was peeking through the clouds, not blue but a definite opening.”

The comment is telling. The couple was looking at a sucker hole. In this case it didn’t even go all the way through. Instead, they were apparently looking at a higher layer of clouds through a hole in the lower layer. In that situation, there would be no way to know if the hole would remain long enough to get through it and whether there was enough space above the bottom layer to operate safely. The couple wanted to believe that flight was possible and that was sufficient for the pilot to decide to take off.

After takeoff, one witness stated that the airplane entered the overcast about a 1/3 of a mile beyond the runway end. According to the preliminary NTSB report:

“Witnesses on and near the airport reported that they heard, and occasionally saw, for a period of between 5 and 10 minutes, an airplane flying in their vicinity. All witnesses reported that the sound varied in a way that gave them the impression that the airplane was continuously changing speed and direction, as if it was climbing, descending and circling. One witness, who was in his backyard with his daughter, stated that he was familiar with how airplanes typically sounded, but ‘this one was different.’ The continued variation in sound gave him the impression that the airplane was performing aerobatics, and he questioned the pilot's judgment for performing aerobatics in the clouds. He then saw the airplane fly over his neighbor's house. He said that he ‘never saw a plane that low before,’ and he sent his daughter inside for her safety. Another witness at the airport saw the airplane emerge from the overcast, headed away from him to the west, and disappear below the treeline. He then saw the airplane re-emerge, and climb back up into the overcast. All witnesses reported that their sightings of the airplane were very brief, and lasted only a few seconds.”

Most witnesses only reported a single sound of impact, which some described as a "thump." The aircraft came down within a mile of the departure runway and at a steep angle, according to the New Jersey State Police. The first 911 call was placed at 1059.

This pilot’s decision making was based solely upon hope. He was hoping that every possible turn of luck would go his way. In his blind pursuit of flying a trip that was obviously important to him, he recklessly disregarded FAA regulations and the laws of common sense. The outcome was predictable to everyone except the pilot and his wife. It offers up an important lesson in how pilots can be blind to every fact except one—their desire to complete a flight at any cost.

Comments

[Sylvia]

Oh how awful! And almost 400 hours experience, how *could* he take off into that?

I got trapped in France for three days once, with family, paying for hotel bills and wishing the clouds would clear. I will admit that the pressure of get-home-itis was mounting each morning as I checked the TAF. But I also knew there was the option of abandoning the Saratoga and getting a commercial flight if it really didn't improve and I never considered a VFR on top attempt which it sounds like he must have been planning.

I suppose my decisions were helped by the fact that I was flying North and had a water crossing to take into account but although I really wanted to get everyone back to England, I could never imagine taking off into IMC in hopes of an improvement!

[Syed Mohammad Husain]

This is murder. Please have some instrument proficiency/certification incorporated in the basic license. There is no VFR flying certainty anywhere once airborne.
I wrote three years back about being caught in the open in a cross country in fast moving weather with no radio contact(possible).

[JDW]

I disagree with Syed. There is VFR certainty if you take off into, and stay in, VFR conditions. If you decide to fly a long cross-country as a non-instrument rated pilot and you run into bad weather, then you must land while still in VFR conditions and wait out the weather.
Also, instrument proficiency is a part of obtaining your private pilot rating. The regs require 3 hours of simulated or actual instrument time. I presume this is required so that in case you do accidentally fly into IMC, you can do a 180 and get back out of it without killing yourself.
This accident was an easily preventable tragedy (and should be viewed as Darwin at work). No need for more laws and regulations!

[Max Trescott]

JDW, I agree, VFR flight can be completed safely under some circumstances. That's apparent to those of us who live in CA where the weather is VFR 97% of the time.
One point on the 3 hours. While the original idea might have been to give people enough skills to do a 180, it may also have a negative effect. And that's to give people the False impression that because they did 3 hours under the hood that they don't need to worry about blundering into the clouds because they think they are Capable in doing a 180 in the clouds. 3 hours is nothing compared to the 40 hours needed to get an instrument rating and I wonder if we gave private pilots no instrument training if they'd understand better that they truly are Not equipped to fly in the clouds. This might make them less complacent about accidentally flying into a cloud.

[Sylvia]

They've taken the instrument proficiency out of the JAR PPL for exactly the reasons you describe, Max. Instead, it is reiterated time and time again to avoid ever getting into a position where you are at risk of flying into IMC.

What I don't know is whether anyone has actually compared stats before and after.

[Patrick Flannigan]

I can't imagine taking off VFR in such conditions. Even on an ILS I'm always surprised to see the runway appear under such conditions.

The report indicated that the weather was actually below minimums for the instrument approach going back into that airport: for airline operations we would actually require a takeoff alternate in these conditions. Accident waiting to happen for sure.

In response to Max - I understand your point of view on removing the 3 hours of IFR training, but I would rather err in the opposite direction. I'd rather be overconfident and somewhat prepared for IMC than caught off guard when/if I got myself into a pickle. If anything, require a bit more hood time.

But let me be clear - I would not advocate any changes unless accidental IMC becomes a dominant factor in GA accidents. Tackle the biggest problems first.