Max Trescott Aviation Trends Aloft

Ten Lessons from Cirrus midair crash with Metroliner over Centennial

Last week, all pilots and passengers miraculously survived a midair crash at Centennial Airport, near Denver, CO. A Cirrus SR22, which was flying a right traffic pattern to runway 17R, hit a Metroliner that was on a long final to runway 17L. The Cirrus, which was flying a shallow, continuous turn from downwind to final, hit the Metroliner slightly from behind and above the aircraft. The Cirrus lost it's nose landing gear as it passed through the top of the Metroliner. The Metroliner landed safely and the Cirrus aircraft landed under it CAPS parachute. 

In episode #188 of my Aviation News Talk podcast, I talk with Cirrus Pilot Erik Gundersen, who put together a video that matches the aircraft ground tracks with the tower communications from the two controllers working the parallel runways at Centennial airport. After our conversation, I talk about some of the measurements and calculations I made after I talked with Erik, and how those factor into the accident. At the end, I give ten takeaways that all GA pilots can learn from this accident. You can find Aviation News Talk at: aviationnewstalk.com/blog for iPhone/iPad, or at aviationnewstalk.com/188 for Android and listening on a PC, or wherever you get podcasts.

It was clear from ADS-B data available through multiple sources, that the Cirrus was flying the traffic pattern at speeds at least 50 knots faster than the speeds specified by Cirrus. As Erik and I discussed, Cirrus states in their FOMs that the downwind should be flown at 100 knots, base at 90 knots, and final at 80 knots, and at slightly slower speeds for short field landings. Arguably, this accident would never have happened if the only change the pilot made was that he flew the correct pattern speeds. 

Faster speeds require steeper bank angles to maintain the same turn radius. As Erik and I discussed, the faster you go, the larger the turn radius, which means at faster airspeeds, your turns become wider, unless you fly a steeper bank angle. Even at the very high speeds this aircraft was flying, if he had only increased his bank to 30 degrees, he would have actually turned just inside of 17R, the runway he was assigned. But since he was at a shallow bank angle, which I calculated to be about 18 degrees, he grossly overshot the centerlines of both runways.

A few people have suggested the Cirrus pilot was mistakenly headed for 17L. That’s certainly possible, as on numerous occasions, when flying to airports with parallel runways, I’ve had to intervene when a client started heading to the wrong runway. That seems to happen most often when the intended runway is shorter and less prominent than the larger runway to which they are mistakenly heading.

In this case though, it seems unlikely the Cirrus pilot was mistakenly headed for 17L, as he was also vastly overshooting that runway as well. I measured the angle at which the Cirrus pilot intersected the centerline for 17L, and it appears the Cirrus pilot still needed to turn another 56 degrees to be aligned with final. So he was less than halfway through the turn from base to final when he hit the Metroliner. So if he was mistakenly headed for 17L, he was doing a very poor job at lining up with that runway, as he was blowing through that centerline as well.

Here's a summary of my ten takeaways:
1. Fly the correct traffic pattern speeds
2. Faster speeds require steeper bank angles
3. Autopilots don’t bank steeply enough for use in the pattern
4. Get comfortable with 30 degree banks in the pattern
5. Don’t overshoot the final, but if you do, consider going around.
6. Refer to a traffic system to identify pattern traffic
7. If in doubt, start your turn early
8. Use G1000 and Perspective Track Vectors to eliminate overshoot final*
9. Don’t Get Distracted
10. Bring a parachute

*If you fly a G1000 or Perspective glass cockpit and are unfamiliar with these features, please buy my G1000 and Perspective book.

There are so many lessons to be learned from this accident, so please listen to this episode of my podcast. If you're unfamiliar with how to listen to podcasts, the easiest way to do it is to download one of our dedicated apps for your phone. Just go to the Apple App Store or the Google Play Store, and search for "Aviation News Talk." Or, click here for the dedicated app for iOS and dedicated app for Android. And podcasts are free, so they'll never cost you anything!

Aviation Joke - Hunting for Moose in Alaska

To date, most every post on this site has been a seriously one related to General Aviation. So I hope you'll indulge me while I share my all time favorite aviation joke. I heard it a number of years ago, but was reminded of it when I noticed it this evening in the pre-study material for my upcoming MES (multiengine seaplane) rating. I hope you enjoy too!

The story is told of an Alaskan bush pilot who contracted with a group of hunters to transport them and their gear to a remote lake. It was agreed that the pilot would return in ten days to fly the hunting party back to civilization. The pilot was as good as his word and ten days later he taxied up to the dock where the hunters had assembled their gear and trophies. Looking over the cargo the pilot announced, “you fellas have a problem here. I know I told you when I dropped you off that this is a one moose airplane. You’ve got two moose here and you’ll have to leave one behind.”

Having gone to the trouble to drag the two moose to the dock the hunters were understandably reluctant to abandon half of their trophies. They tried to reason with the pilot with arguments like, “They’re unusually small moose don’t you think?” and, “they were a matched set. We couldn’t take one without the other.” The pilot stood his ground. He countered, ”in the first place I’ll grant you that some moose are smaller than others but there’s no such thing as a small moose. I’m sorry about the matched set, but you were told that this is a one moose airplane. Now if you’ll just agree on which moose to leave behind, we’ll be on our way.

In an attempt to appeal to the pilot’s avarice the hunters said, ”If it’s a matter of money we’re willing to pay.”  “It’s nothing to do with money.” The pilot said, ”It’s a problem of weight and balance and airplane performance, the length of this lake, the obstructions on the shore, and a number of other things such as density altitude. All of which add up to one thing. Flying out of here with two moose is unsafe and I’m not about to do it at any price. Now if you’ll just pick the lucky moose that’s going with us we’ll get it into the airplane and be off.”

Not to be dissuaded, the hunters voiced the ultimate argument. “Oh all right. If you don’t think you can do it we’ll have to agree, but your friend Joe flew us out of this very spot last year with two moose that were bigger than these.” Knowing that Joe flew the same kind of airplane the pilot reconsidered his decision. “Joe flew you out of this lake last year?” Yep.” ”with two moose?” “that’s right and they were lots bigger than these scrawny things.” The pilot thought for a moment. “Load em up”, he said, “we’ll give it a try.”

 The floats were nearly under water as they staggered away from the dock. The pilot taxied the airplane to the downwind end of the lake and circled at full throttle, going a little faster with each turn. At last he headed for the far end of the lake and, at the last possible moment, the airplane crawled into the air. They flew no more than a foot or so above the water, in what I guess you would call lake effect, but the airplane didn’t climb. Presently the lake ended and they flew in lake shore effect until the airplane crashed into some low scrub growth near the tree line.

Everyone survived with minor injuries, but the pilot was knocked unconscious in the crash. He was attended by one of the hunters. As he came to, and, as so often is the case, he asked “where are we?” The hunter looked toward the tree line and then back to the lake. ”I’m not absolutely sure,” he said, “but it looks as if you got us about a Quarter mile further than Joe did last year.”

 

 

What all Pilots Can Learn from Alaska Plane Crash Rescue

It’s the worst kind of rescue one can imagine—one where the weather is so bad the rescuers crash and need rescuing. You’ll find the details in a well-written, 3-part feature story by Craig Medred in the Alaska Dispatch about a little reported plane crash last summer. The story is as compelling as a novel, but is virtually unknown because it was shadowed by a plane crash that killed Senator Ted Stevens the following day. Buried in the story are lessons that all pilots should heed.

In part I, we learn that 49-year-old Wasilla pilot Don Erbey was...

Glassy Water Landing in a Lake Amphibian LA-4-200 Seaplane

If you're receiving this via email, click on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gP13AxrxyPA for easiest viewing of my latest seaplane video. I've always been intrigued by the Lake series of amphibious aircraft and after many years of contemplating a purchase, I bought one several months ago. Last week, I was planning to experiment with mounting video cameras outside the airplane, but was disappointed to discover that the weather was 1/4 mile visibility and 100 foot vertical visibility at the Byron airport, adjacent to where I'd be landing on the water.

I fully expected not to see any water, but when I arrived the clouds had blown to the east and risen a few hundred feet. As a result, I was able to easily get under the clouds and shoot some excellent video while remaining outside of the clouds. Since I was below 1200 feet and in Class G, the legal requirement was that I remain clear of clouds. Had I been in Class E, it would have been impossible to shoot this video, since I would have to have been either 1000 feet above the clouds or 500 feet below them.

Since the winds were calm, the water was like a mirror, reflecting the clouds off the surface. Glassy water landings are among the most difficult water landings to make, since it's often impossible for a pilot to judge his or her height above the water. Seaplanes pilots use a glass water landing technique where they descend at 100 to 150 feet per minute until they contact the water. In this case, with a narrow canal, there were many visual references around me, making my glassy water landing much easier than if it were performed on a larger body of water, far from shore.

I hope you enjoy the video. If you do, please click the "Like" button on the YouTube player. And I also hope you consider getting a seaplane rating! 

Night Flying Safety—What Your CFI Didn’t Teach You!

Winter is rapidly approaching with its shorter days and increased likelihood of flying at night. There’s a common myth that flying at night is no different than flying in the daytime because the airplane doesn’t know it’s dark. While perhaps clever, that’s irrelevant. What does matter is that night accentuates the shortcoming of pilots’ senses and perceptions, which makes it harder to fly safely at night. 

An ex-Navy pilot told me...

New NTSB 830 Rules May Increase Reports of Near Mid-Air Collisions

The pilots of United Flight 889 initiated the report of their near mid-air collision with a Cessna 182 near San Francisco last week. New NTSB rules may make those reports more common, so don’t be surprised if the number of reported near mid-air collisions rises in the coming year.

All pilots are required to receive ground instruction on...

NTSB investigating Near Miss Between United Jet and small airplane near SFO - ATC Audio

The NTSB emailed a press release about 1 PM PDT today stating “NTSB has launched an investigation to determine why a commercial jetliner and a small light airplane came within an estimated 300 feet of colliding over San Francisco on Saturday.” While much of this event has been made by news media, a review of the San Francisco tower tape shows that both aircraft were in contact with the tower and followed their instructions. Transcripts of the ATC audio suggests that neither aircraft was in danger, though the aircraft may have been a little closer to each other—a loss of separation in FAA parlance—than permitted. Note: I've edited the ATC audio to remove non-relevant communications. [Follow-up article: New NTSB Rules May Increase Reports of Near Mid-Air Collisions].

The rules for separation vary depending upon where an aircraft is located. These aircraft were both operating in the Class B airspace that surrounds San Francisco and other large airports. In Class B airspace, VFR aircraft, such as the light plane, must be separated from jet aircraft by one of the following three criteria:

1. 1 1/2 miles horizontal separation, or

2. 500 feet vertical separation, or

3. Visual separation.

In this case, the controller was relying upon #3 visual separation. Once the rules for visual separation are met, aircraft are allowed to come as close to each other they would like, as long as they do not collide with each other. In this case, whether there was a loss of separation depends upon whether the controller completed the requirements for visual separation before the aircraft came within 500 feet vertically of each other. The NTSB should be able to make this determination after they compare audio transcripts with aircraft radar tracks. 

The instructions for controllers to establish visual separation are as follows:

A pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows:

(a) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft including position, direction and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention.

(b) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight.

(c) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft.

(d) Advise the pilot if the radar targets appear likely to converge.

NOTE-

Issue this advisory in conjunction with the instruction to maintain visual separation, or thereafter if the controller subsequently becomes aware that the targets are merging.

(e) If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.

(f) If the pilot advises he/she has the traffic in sight and will maintain visual separation from it (the pilot must use that entire phrase), the controller need only “approve” the operation instead of restating the instructions.

At San Francisco, the light aircraft was at approximately 1500 feet when the tower controller advised its pilot “70 Echo, Traffic off the departure end climbing out of 500 heavy triple 7.” The light aircraft advised that it had the Boeing 777 in sight and the controller instructed “Maintain visual separation, pass behind that aircraft.” Once that conversation was completed, the controller established visual separation between the aircraft and they were then legally permitted to come as close to each other as they chose. At issue however, will be whether the controller completed his conversation with the light aircraft before it came within 500 feet vertically of the United Boeing 777. If the aircraft were less than 500 feet apart before he completed the conversation establishing visual separation, than he probably had what controllers call “a deal,” an error which led to aircraft coming closer together than permitted. If he completed the conversation in time, than it seems unlikely that any rules were broken.

Note that a 777 typically climbs out at about 2,500 feet per minute. Thus if the controller truly initiated the visual separation instructions when the 777 was at 500 feet, he had 12 seconds to complete the conversation before the aircraft reached 1000 feet. 

So if no rules were broken, why was the event reported? According to the NTSB, the United aircraft’s TCAS unit issued a conflict resolution. This occurs when it detects a potential collision and issues instructions to climb or descend. Any time a conflict resolution is issued, United company rules require the pilot to file a report to the company’s Flight Safety Awareness Program within 24 hours. Those reports are reviewed within a week by company management, the pilot’s union and the NTSB. And that is probably what triggered the current investigation.

I’ve attached my transcript of the audio below. Note that today’s NTSB press release incorrectly stated that the light plane was “an Aeronca 11AC (N9270E),” and this mistake is being repeated in most news reports. According to a pilot I contacted who was familiar with the incident, the light aircraft was actually N9870E, a Cessna 182, which is confirmed by the San Francisco tower audio. I exchanged email with the NTSB public relations department today and they replied that they will notify the NTSB investigator assigned to the case.

In the transcript, SFO tower is the tower controller. UA889 is the Boeing 777 departing San Francisco for Beijing and 9870E is the Cessna 182, which was flying north to south along highway 101.

11:09:28

9870E: San Francisco Tower 9870 Echo 1.6 [indicating he’s at 1,600 feet]

11:09:33

SFO Tower: 8270 Echo San Francisco tower, roger keep Highway 101 off to your left side

11:09:33

9870E:  70 Echo

11:10:03

SFO Tower: United 889 28 Left Heavy Position and hold

11:10:06

UA889:  Position and hold 28 Left, United 889

11:11:41

SFO Tower: United 889 Heavy Winds 090 at 6, Runway 28 Left Clear for takeoff.

11:11:41

UA889:  Clear for takeoff 28 Left United, uh Triple 889

11:13:44

SFO Tower: 70 Echo, Traffic off the departure end climbing out of 500 heavy triple 7.

11:13:49

9870E: 70 Echo is in sight

11:13:51

SFO Tower: Maintain visual separate, pass behind that aircraft

11:13:55

9870E: 70 Echo, Pass behind him

11:13:57

UA889:  Is that Traffic for 889?

11:13:59

SFO Tower: Just ahead and to your right, has you in sight, Cessna one-thousand 500, they’re maintaining visual separation

11:14:05

UA889: [Unintelligible]

11:14:07

SFO Tower: 889 Heavy traffic no factor, Contact Norcal Departure

11:14:10

UA889: OK, That set off a TCAS that was….that

11:14:18

UA889:  We need to talk.

11:14:21

SFO Tower: Roger.

NTSB Glass Cockpit Safety Study Concludes Pilots Need More Training

 On Tuesday March 9, the NTSB held a public Board meeting to consider a study on whether glass cockpit-equipped general aviation aircraft are safer than aircraft with traditional round gauges. The Board reached the same conclusion as other similar studies. Glass Cockpits have the potential to increase safety. However pilots need additional training, both initially and on a recurrent basis, to reap the benefits of these technologies. Five of the six study recommendations were...

New Jersey Pilot Kills Himself and Son in Predictable Plane Crash

A new post yesterday on the All-Things-Aviation.com blog related "3 stories about pilots who didn’t learn, didn’t care and didn’t survive." I was all too familiar with one of those stories having read about it in the Cape May County Herald after it occurred last month. There's something particularly heart rending about a Private pilot taking off with his son into a 300 foot overcast with the all too predictable result. Clearly this pilot was not a student of history, aircraft accident data, or FAA regulations. Otherwise he would have realized that he needlessly threw away his life and that of his son.

The pilot was 53 years old, had a total of 395 hours and was not instrument rated. According to witnesses, the pilot had originally planned to depart KOBI, the Woodbine Municipal airport in Woodbine, NJ, for a family hunting trip to Indiana two days before the accident, but weather postponed his trip. The following day, the pilot requested assistance from the airport manager in using an internet-based flight planning tool and accessed DUATs once that evening.

The next morning, the day of the accident, IMC prevailed, but the forecast called for conditions to improve as the day progressed. The recorded weather conditions at the airport reported an overcast ceiling at 300 feet above ground level (agl) for the period from 10 AM to noon. This is considered low IFR and in fact the ceiling was below the minimums for the published instrument approach procedures at the airport. Witnesses universally reported a solid overcast ceiling was present at 200 to 300 feet agl, that "there were no holes" in the ceiling, and that "there was no sun" shining anywhere that they could see.

About 10:40 AM, the pilot radioed his intention to depart and began his takeoff roll on runway 31 in his 1972 Piper Arrow. According to newspaper reports, his wife “Valerie, 52, was actually very close to getting on the plane with her men. Even though she wasn’t packed for the trip, she was going to fly with them, buy some clothes in Indiana, and fly back on a commercial flight in a few days. The only reason she didn’t go was because Ted saw the break in the clouds and wanted to take advantage of it right away. There wasn’t time to get her on the flight.”

The quote speaks volumes about the state of mind of the pilot. If there wasn’t “enough time to get her on the plane,” then clearly he felt that he was trying to depart through a very narrow window of opportunity. Narrow windows mean narrow margins of safety. This pilot was so intent upon completing his mission—one which had already been delayed for two days—that he was willing to take on extraordinary risks without thought for his own safety. No sane Private pilot should take off into a 300 foot solid overcast.

In that frame of mind, the pilot was probably looking for any possible hint that the trip might be possible. “I was there and I saw what he saw,” his wife told the Herald. “There was a break in the weather. There was a thin spot where the sun was peeking through the clouds, not blue but a definite opening.”

The comment is telling. The couple was looking at a sucker hole. In this case it didn’t even go all the way through. Instead, they were apparently looking at a higher layer of clouds through a hole in the lower layer. In that situation, there would be no way to know if the hole would remain long enough to get through it and whether there was enough space above the bottom layer to operate safely. The couple wanted to believe that flight was possible and that was sufficient for the pilot to decide to take off.

After takeoff, one witness stated that the airplane entered the overcast about a 1/3 of a mile beyond the runway end. According to the preliminary NTSB report:

“Witnesses on and near the airport reported that they heard, and occasionally saw, for a period of between 5 and 10 minutes, an airplane flying in their vicinity. All witnesses reported that the sound varied in a way that gave them the impression that the airplane was continuously changing speed and direction, as if it was climbing, descending and circling. One witness, who was in his backyard with his daughter, stated that he was familiar with how airplanes typically sounded, but ‘this one was different.’ The continued variation in sound gave him the impression that the airplane was performing aerobatics, and he questioned the pilot's judgment for performing aerobatics in the clouds. He then saw the airplane fly over his neighbor's house. He said that he ‘never saw a plane that low before,’ and he sent his daughter inside for her safety. Another witness at the airport saw the airplane emerge from the overcast, headed away from him to the west, and disappear below the treeline. He then saw the airplane re-emerge, and climb back up into the overcast. All witnesses reported that their sightings of the airplane were very brief, and lasted only a few seconds.”

Most witnesses only reported a single sound of impact, which some described as a "thump." The aircraft came down within a mile of the departure runway and at a steep angle, according to the New Jersey State Police. The first 911 call was placed at 1059.

This pilot’s decision making was based solely upon hope. He was hoping that every possible turn of luck would go his way. In his blind pursuit of flying a trip that was obviously important to him, he recklessly disregarded FAA regulations and the laws of common sense. The outcome was predictable to everyone except the pilot and his wife. It offers up an important lesson in how pilots can be blind to every fact except one—their desire to complete a flight at any cost.

Graphic Video Highlights Dangers of Inadvertent VFR into IMC

Today on the Golf Hotel Whiskey blog, I saw one of the most chilling flying videos I’ve ever viewed. It’s a graphic example of why inadvertent VFR into IMC is the most dangerous accident type. Statistically, if a pilot inadvertently flies into a cloud and subsequently has an accident, 90% of the time one or more people aboard that flight will die. By contrast, only about 15% of daytime accidents are fatal and 30% of nighttime accidents are fatal.  Therefore, when teaching Private pilots I literally tell them “Do not enter a cloud under any circumstances under penalty of death.” Obviously that doesn’t apply later when they become instrument rated and are on an IFR flight plan.

In this video, the pilot shows a callous disregard for the dangers of flying in the clouds...

Flying Safety Tip - Identify Local Hotspots

Accidents occur more frequently in localized hotspots. As pilots, we should identify these areas and increase our vigilance when operating near them. Some of these hotspots are generic and are found everywhere while others are specific to a local area.

Generic hotspots include airports and VORs. For example, mid-air collisions are...